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BACK TO THE FUTURE OF CLINICAL 
LEGAL EDUCATION 
Phyllis Goldfarb* 
Abstract: The premier strength of legal education resides in its dual iden-
tity as an academic department of a university and a professional school 
training future practitioners. This dual identity, which gives law school its 
unique blend of the intellectual and the practical, can support law gradu-
ates as the legal profession undergoes a profound restructuring. Tradi-
tional classroom education, when focused not on revealing legal doctrine 
but on cultivating foundational skills of analysis, interpretation, synthesis, 
and reasoning, will benefit law graduates even in an altered legal practice 
environment. Clinical education—which engages students in the multi-
dimensional enterprise of representing clients to inculcate a wide range of 
generalizable skills and public service values—will need to assume a larger 
role in tomorrow’s legal curriculum. Because clinical learning emerges 
from yet transcends specific, holistic, lawyering contexts, it can enable law 
graduates to adapt to transformation in the legal profession of the future. 
Introduction 
 A Zen Buddhist story depicts a rider on a horse that is galloping at 
a tremendous pace, as if rushing to an important destination. A by-
stander shouts out, “Where are you going?” The rider replies, “I don’t 
know. Ask the horse.”1 
 In some respects, legal educators are riding that runaway horse. 
The legal profession is undergoing a seismic shift and it is difficult to 
determine exactly where it is headed. There is increasing commentary 
on the sources and contents of this shift, suggesting that it is animated 
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1 Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching 24 (2d ed. 1999). 
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by changes in social, economic, and cultural forces such as the interna-
tionalization of markets, the incursion of technology, and a series of 
economic and global cataclysms occurring since the turn of the mil-
lennium.2 Even if changes in legal practice were in the offing anyway, 
these forces have intensified the quantity and the quality of change. 
 If law schools do not want to ride into these changes without a de-
liberate sense of purpose, if they do not want to go the way of Borders 
Books—a company closing many of its doors because it was not nimble 
enough to respond to the technological era3—then it is imperative that 
they join those who have begun considering what the likely changes in 
society and the legal profession will mean for the future of legal educa-
tion.4 One of the few things that seem certain is that law schools will 
not weather societal changes comfortably by remaining the same.5 The 
traditional law school model now appears economically and education-
                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Vanishing American Lawyer 96 (2010) 
(“[A]lternative information sources threaten the knowledge monopoly on which lawyers 
have depended . . . .”); ABA Standing Comm. on Research About the Future of the Legal 
Profession, Working Notes: Deliberations of the Committee on Research About the Future of the Legal 
Profession on the Current Status of the Legal Profession, 16 Me. B.J., 236, 236 (2001) (“The prac-
tice of law and the administration of justice are at the brink of change of an unprece-
dented and exponential kind and magnitude. This Age of Technological Revolution, to-
gether with the globalization of business and competition, are transforming our profession 
. . . .”); Sarah Kellogg, The Transformation of Legal Education, Wash. Lawyer, May 2011, at 
19, 19 (“Forces at work in the world are fundamentally transforming the legal profes-
sion.”); John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 5, 2011, at A1 (noting that organization of legal work is changing due to automation 
of formerly labor-intensive tasks). 
3 Derek Thompson, Books, Borders and Beyond: How Digital Tech Is Changing Retail, At-
lantic ( Jul 20, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/07/ 
books-borders-and-beyond-how-digital-tech-is-changing-retail/242211 (“Borders Inc. is clos-
ing, undone by a perfect storm of book digitization, the growth of Amazon, and an inabil-
ity to turn a brick-and-mortar company into a zeros-and-ones business.”). 
4 See Karen Sloan, Action on Law School Reform: Legal Educators Are Organizing to Finally 
Move Beyond the Talking Stage, Nat’l L.J. & Legal Times, Aug. 22, 2001, at 1, 6–7 (describ-
ing the formation of a consortium of law schools—with financial support from the Univer-
sity of Denver’s Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System—in an initia-
tive called Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers, designed to facilitate the development of new 
teaching methods for law schools); Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not for Whom the Law School Bell 
Tolls, AALS News, Fall 2011, at 1, 3 (calling law faculty to “action as a community” to ad-
dress “daunting developments in the world of legal education”). 
5 Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Economic Model of Legal Education Work for Law 
Schools, Law Firms (or Anyone Else)?, N.Y. St. B. Ass’n J., Oct. 2010, at 20, 20, 26 (stating that 
“some schools will fail; others will adjust,” and that “[t]he years ahead suggest that law 
schools . . . must change or die”); Olivas, supra note 4, at 3 (“[N]ot all law schools can sur-
vive the end game of some of these events.”). 
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ally unsustainable.6 The emerging concern is that law schools cost too 
much and deliver too little of what our brave new world requires,7 a 
scenario that calls on legal educators to rethink the academic enter-
prise. 
 As with other kinds of challenges, attitude and approach matter. As 
vexing as it is to reconceive legal education, it is a viable endeavor, es-
pecially as law schools already have significant strengths to draw upon 
in facing the future, even if they need repackaging and reconceptualiz-
ing.8 In the reconstructive process ahead, reformers should ask the fol-
lowing questions: How can legal education survive these profound 
changes? How can it thrive in the world of the future? And how can it 
strive to contribute to the ability of the world to thrive in the decades to 
come? In addressing these questions, there is a strong argument that 
contextual educational methods—most notably clinical education—will 
                                                                                                                      
6 Matasar, supra note 5, at 22 (“The demand for legal education will decline at high-
priced schools whose graduates are having difficulty repaying their loans.”); see also David 
Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. Times, Jul. 17, 2011, at BU 1 (explaining that 
some law students now borrow $150,000 or more before they graduate, but the decline in 
post-graduation employment prospects makes such financing “a vastly riskier proposition” 
than it used to be). In a recent New York Times article that provoked controversy among law 
professors, David Segal asserted a need in the current climate for the law school curricu-
lum to teach students more about law practice. See David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law 
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Segal, What They Don’t 
Teach] (“What [law students] did not get, for all that time and money, was much practical 
training.”); see also Editorial, Legal Education Reform, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2011, at A16 (as-
serting that the “crisis” in American legal education can be addressed by teaching “useful 
legal ideas and skills in more effective ways”). 
7 This perception has generated a phenomenon in the blogosphere in which under-
employed law graduates decry legal education as a “scam.” See Lucille A. Jewel, You’re Doing 
It Wrong: How the Anti-Law School Scam Blogging Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 
Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 239, 240–42 (2011). Indeed, attorneys David Anziska and Jesse 
Strauss filed class action lawsuits against two law schools for fraudulent reporting of em-
ployment statistics. Karen Sloan, Another 15 Law Schools Targeted Over Jobs Data, Nat’l L.J. 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202517930210&slret- 
urn=1. A New York judge recently dismissed the case. See Joe Palazzolo, Judge Tosses Lawsuit 
Against Law School Over Employment Stats, Wall St. J.L. Blog (Mar. 21, 2012, 3:12 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/03/21/judge-tosses-lawsuit-against-law-school-over-employ 
ment-stats. One of the attorneys in the action, David Anziska, stated: “‘We strongly believe 
that by the end of 2012, almost every school in the nation will be sued . . . .’” Sloan, su-
pra(quoting attorney David Anziska). Recently, the U.S. Senate began gathering informa-
tion about law student debt and employment as a possible prelude to Senate hearings on 
legal education. See Ashby Jones, Lawmakers Probe Law Schools’ Data, Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 
2011, at A5 (reporting that the U.S. Senate is “strongly considering” hearings on legal 
education, student debt, and law schools’ representations about post-graduation employ-
ment prospects). 
8 See infra notes 17–31 and accompanying text. 
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play a leading role in helping law schools of the future to survive, to 
thrive, and to strive to contribute to meeting society’s needs. 
 To avoid the irony of examining the role of contextual legal educa-
tion out of its context, Part I of this Article examines contextual legal 
education in general, and clinical legal education in particular, within 
the overall educational mission of the law school. Part I highlights the 
role that law school’s dual identity, as both a professional school and an 
academic institution, can play in enabling legal education to navigate 
the uncharted waters in which we are already immersed. This dual 
identity is the source of our capacity to meet future challenges. At the 
same time, it is also a potential drawback if we do not modify and reor-
ganize our longstanding approach to these two diverging, but reconcil-
able, features of our institutional character. 
 After laying the conceptual groundwork for this project of recon-
ceiving and reconciling, which entails refashioning the law school’s 
dual mission into an integrated curriculum,9 Part II proposes expan-
sion of the clinical method of instruction.10 This Part argues that clini-
cal methods, rooted in particular yet generalizable contexts, are the 
most promising that law schools have for confronting future challenges 
and realizing their potential as schools of both academic and profes-
sional instruction.11 Elaborating on the nature of clinical methods, Part 
II connects these methods to a contextual pedagogy of skills and values, 
as recommended twenty years ago by the MacCrate Report, and of the 
three apprenticeships—cognitive, skills, and identity—as more recently 
framed and advanced by the Carnegie Report.12 
 Understood broadly, these methodological recommendations en-
compass education in service to others, undergirded by the disciplinary 
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 17–65 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 66–137 and accompanying text. 
11 In this Article, I intend the meaning of “clinical methods” to be broad and to in-
clude a variety of pedagogies for teaching through students’ involvement in actual lawyer-
ing matters, whether this occurs in in-house clinics, clinical components conjoined to law 
school courses, or other kinds of models. For a description of the many and varied forms 
through which students can engage in educational experiences involving real lawyering, 
see Deborah Maranville, Mary A. Lynch, Susan L. Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb & Russell Engler, 
Re-Vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 
56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 517 (2011–2012). 
12 See Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass’n, Legal 
Education and Professional Development—An Educational Continuum: Report of 
the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 327–38 
(1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]; William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith 
Welch Wegner, Lloyd Bond, & Lee S. Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation 
for the Profession of Law 27–29 (2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report]. 
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knowledge and strategic skills that effective service requires.13 The gen-
eralizability of these skills will aid future law graduates as they enter a 
changing profession.14 The sense of professional purpose that such 
education provides, the prospect that professional identity can serve a 
public good greater than oneself, is another feature of this kind of edu-
cation that can enable law graduates to thrive in their professional lives 
and to contribute at the same time to the thriving of others.15 
 After exploring the nature and value of the clinical method of in-
struction, Part II addresses the argument that expanding these meth-
ods throughout the law school curriculum is economically prohibi-
tive.16 While the costs of this expansion are great, the costs of non-
expansion are arguably greater. Moreover, the reconceptualization pro-
ject promoted by this Article may also yield some cost savings, freeing 
new resources to support the curriculum reform that legal education 
needs now more than ever. 
I. The Twin Nature of Legal Education 
A. Current Strengths for Facing Change 
 Law school has long had a dual identity—or, less charitably, a split 
personality—as both an academic department in a university and a 
school that trains students for a professional trade.17 Since the mid-
                                                                                                                      
 
13 Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 27 (“The common problem of professional 
education is how to teach the complex ensemble of analytic thinking, skillful practice, and 
wise judgment on which each profession rests.”). 
14 The notion of “teaching for transfer,” to enable students to apply in a new context 
what they have learned in a previous context, has considerable currency among educa-
tional theorists. See Anthony Marini & Randy Genereux, The Challenge of Teaching for Trans-
fer, in Teaching for Transfer: Fostering Generalization in Learning 1, 1–3 (Anne 
McKeough et al. eds., 1995). 
15 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 32 (“Professionals . . . do work that has a 
public purpose.”) (citing Nicholas Lemann, Liberal Education & Professionals, Liberal 
Educ., Spring 2004, at 12, 15); see also Walter Bennett, The Lawyer’s Myth: Reviving 
Ideals in the Legal Profession 128 (2001) (“Professionalism demands that we face . . . 
moral responsibility seriously and make deliberate choices that utilize our capacity to 
serve.”). Poignantly, Bennett asserts that “the search for professionalism is really a search 
for one’s wholeness as a human being.” Bennett, supra, at ix. 
16 See infra notes 129–135 and accompanying text. 
17 Appointed to the Dane Chair at Harvard Law School in 1829, Joseph Story is cred-
ited with advancing the idea that law school was both an academic department of a univer-
sity and a practical training center for lawyers. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 189 (citing 
Albert J. Harno, Legal Education in the United States: A Report Prepared for 
the Survey of the Legal Profession 40–50 (1st ed. 1953)). The authors of the Carnegie 
Report characterize law schools as “hybrid institutions.” Carnegie Report, supra note 12, 
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nineteenth century, law schools have lived in the creative tension be-
tween the intellectual and the practical with varying degrees of suc-
cess.18 This duality of identity bodes well for the ability of law schools to 
face a transforming future. A law school’s ability to respond to the chal-
lenges of the future rests largely on its ability to inhabit each side of its 
dual mission effectively and to use each in service of the other.19 
 Law school clinics are one of the key sites for advancing the law 
school’s twin mission.20 There are others as well.21 This Article con-
tends, consistent with the Carnegie Report’s recommendations, that when 
a law school’s curriculum is structured in an integrated and coherent 
fashion,22 to cultivate the law school’s intellectual and practical aspects 
as an academic unit of a university and a professional trade school, stu-
dents are simultaneously prepared not just for work in the world as we 
know it today, but for work in the world that has yet to appear on the 
horizon. 
 Legal educators frequently assert that their goal is to teach stu-
dents to think like lawyers.23 Thinking like a lawyer is, for the most part, 
                                                                                                                      
 
at 4 (describing law schools as hybrid institutions, part of both the legal profession and the 
modern research university, with Harvard Law School in the nineteenth century as the 
first to blend the two). 
18 One historian suggests, however, that Harvard Law School was essentially a trade 
school in the 1830s and that, after Joseph Story’s death, Harvard adopted almost exclu-
sively a textbook method of instruction. See Morgan, supra note 2, at 189 n.32. 
19 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 12, 13. 
20 My previous effort to examine clinical education as simultaneously intellectual and 
practical is Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Edu-
cation, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1601 (1991). 
21 While an examination of questions of curricular sequencing is beyond the scope of 
this Article, the predominant view among those who have addressed the relationship be-
tween the study of legal analysis in traditional legal education and the study of law practice in 
clinical legal education is that, where both are offered, the former should precede the latter 
at least to some degree. See, e.g., Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 13 (“[L]egal analysis is 
the prior condition for practice because it supplies the essential background assumptions 
and rules for engaging with the world through the medium of the law. The analysis, critique, 
and development of legal doctrine . . . constitute the first, essential element of legal educa-
tion.”). Others have suggested that students should be introduced to clinical legal education 
“early and often.” See Russell Engler, Professor of Law & Dir. of Clinical Programs, New Eng-
land Law School, Remarks at the Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Symposium: 
The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Practice—Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in Ex-
periential Legal Education (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/ 
newsevents/events/conferences/carnegie_symp_twlj/carnegie_video.html. 
22 The authors of the Carnegie Report view their project as an effort “to imagine a 
more capacious, yet more integrated, legal education.” See Carnegie Report, supra note 
12, at 12. 
23 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 101 
(1930) (“[The first year] aims, in the old phrase, to get you to ‘thinking like a lawyer.’”). 
But see Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a 
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thinking logically and precisely about issues that arise in legal con-
texts.24 The primary justification for the traditional first-year curricu-
lum—in particular for its case-dialogue method, which the authors of 
the Carnegie Report label as the first year’s signature pedagogy—is that it 
cultivates these thinking skills by teaching students close, detailed, and 
critical reading of judicial opinions and various ways of reasoning from 
these opinions.25 In well-taught classes focused on appellate case ex-
cerpts, students can learn how to interpret judicial opinions; how to 
identify the rhetorical conventions of the genre; how the legal system 
uses analogical reasoning; how to understand, at least to some degree, 
the circumstances that gave rise to the opinions; and how to predict, at 
least to some degree, the circumstances to which these opinions may 
give rise.26 At the conclusion of this educational process, students 
should be able to formulate considered responses to questions such as: 
What are the consequences of these decisions for other kinds of poten-
tially analogous or potentially distinguishable situations? How do vari-
ous decisions fit together to form a doctrinal pattern? Is the pattern a 
sensible one or does it need to be improved? 
 Analysis, synthesis, reasoning, and application to new situations of 
the legal doctrine that emerges from judicial opinions are fundamental 
lawyering skills,27 which are at once both intellectual and practical en-
                                                                                                                      
 
Lawyer” 3–6 (2007) (reporting results of a careful linguistic study of eight Contracts 
classes in eight law schools, showing that first-year law students undergo a transformation 
in their overall approach to language—not just in how to think like a lawyer, but in how to 
think, talk, read, and write like a lawyer—which entails focusing on legal categories and 
legal contexts rather than on social contexts and human situations). 
24 See Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 101 (“You are to acquire ability to think precisely, 
to analyze coldly, to work within a body of materials that is given, to see, and see only, and 
manipulate, the machinery of the law.”); see also Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 54 
(“The ability to think like a lawyer emerges as the ability to translate messy situations into 
the clarity and precision of legal procedure and doctrine and then to take strategic action 
through legal argument in order to advance a client’s cause before a court or in negotia-
tion.”). But see Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and 
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. Legal Educ. 112, 117 
(2002) (“Thinking ‘like a lawyer’ is . . . critical, pessimistic, and depersonalizing[,] . . . . 
[which is] usually conveyed, and understood, as a new and superior way of thinking, rather 
than an important but strictly limited legal tool.”). 
25 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 47, 50–51. 
26 See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st-Century Perspec-
tive, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984) (offering a trenchant description of the analytic modes 
of thinking that can and cannot be taught in the traditional law school classroom). 
27 Some of the most thoughtful teaching of these skills occurs in legal writing pro-
grams. See, e.g., Daniel L. Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of the Legal Writing Course: The Theory 
and Methodology of Analytical Critique, 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 651, 659 (2007); Jane Kent Gion-
friddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1, 4, 7 
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deavors.28 Although the legal profession may change in a variety of ways 
in the not too distant future, it seems likely that thinking logically and 
precisely about legal issues and how they arise, reasoning from legal 
authority to subsequent scenarios, and other kinds of related analytic 
skills are broad and generalizable enough to serve a useful function 
even in an indefinite future.29 
 Of course, lawyers need to think about much more.30 Conse-
quently, legal analysis skills are insufficient in and of themselves. None-
theless, in the right proportion, continued emphasis at an early point 
in the law school curriculum on the development of analytic lawyering 
skills of this sort—what the Carnegie Report termed the “cognitive ap-
prenticeship” of lawyering—seems a defensible choice for legal educa-
tion.31 
                                                                                                                      
(2007); Nelson P. Miller & Bradley J. Charles, Meeting the Carnegie Report’s Challenge to Make 
Legal Analysis Explicit—Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC Framework, 59 J. Legal Educ. 192, 193 
(2009); Susan E. Provenzano & Lesley S. Kagan, Teaching in Reverse: A Positive Approach to 
Analytical Errors in 1L Writing, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 123, 124 (2007). 
28 While legal analysis is often viewed as the intellectual content of the law school cur-
riculum, it is, of course, an eminently practical skill that acquires meaning and value when 
employed in a legal practice setting. See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: 
An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 578 (1987) (offering an illuminating 
discussion of the frequent resemblance between what is deemed intellectual or theoretical 
and what is deemed practical). 
29 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 74–75; Kellogg, supra note 2, at 19. 
30 Professors Todd Rakoff and Martha Minow suggest that we are overstating the 
degree to which the case-dialogue method of classroom teaching can teach students 
to think like lawyers. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case For Another Case 
Method, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 597, 597, 600 (2007). It is misleading, they assert, to equate 
skills of legal analysis with thinking like lawyers, because: 
[L]awyers increasingly need to think in and across more settings, with more 
degrees of freedom, than appear in the universe established by appellate de-
cisions and the traditional questions arising from them . . . . By taking a retro-
spective view of facts already found and procedures already used by a court, 
the appellate decision does little to orient students to the reality of unfolding 
problems with facts still to be enacted, client conduct still to take place, and 
procedural settings still to be chosen and framed. 
 Of course, teachers fight against these restraints . . . [b]ut it is hard to do 
so at a deep level. 
Id. 
31 Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 28 (describing law school’s cognitive appren-
ticeship as focusing on the “habits of mind” central to the legal profession, such as “ana-
lytical reasoning, argument, and research”). 
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B. Limitations and Confusions 
 At the same time, if law schools hope to thrive in the years to 
come, legal educators will have to vow to keep our eyes on the prize 
and not its shadow. Although the pedagogical goal of the law school’s 
primary mode of classroom education is the development of particular 
analytical skills, law professors and law students often behave as if legal 
education’s aim is to develop knowledge of substantive law.32 Too often, 
classes aspiring to analytic skill development morph into classes about 
the substantive legal framework of a particular subject, with professors 
expressing concern about whether they have covered enough of the 
substantive framework during the course of the semester.33 
 Highlighting this problem, Professor Michael Dorf wrote a 2005 
column in FindLaw’s Legal Commentary blog in which he purported 
to condense into a few hundred words all the teaching of the first-year 
of law school.34 The title of his column, The Five-Minute Law School, is an 
apparent allusion to a classic comedy routine by Father Guido Sarducci 
called Five-Minute University.35 Not quite as terse or humorous but in 
the same vein, Professor Dorf summarizes first-year Criminal Law in a 
paragraph, observing that “[c]riminal liability typically only attaches to 
people who commit proscribed acts intentionally, or at least know-
                                                                                                                      
32 One even deeper shadow side of the first year curriculum is law professors’ tenden-
cies to teach in a manner implying that moral or affective reasoning cannot ground legal 
authority, and therefore are inappropriate considerations in legal analysis. See Mertz, su-
pra note 23, at 99. While I am persuaded that this observation accurately captures a pre-
dominant mode of legal education, I do not see it as an invariable consequence of the 
case-dialogue method of first-year classroom teaching. In my view, consciousness of the 
consequences of the message implicit in the traditional law school classroom can lead to 
teaching methods that specifically alter the message, validate moral or affective grounds of 
analysis, and highlight their exclusion from ordinary legal decision-making. See Phyllis 
Goldfarb, Pedagogy of the Suppressed: A Class on Race and the Death Penalty, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 547, 548–50 (2007) (exploring classroom methods for providing greater 
context in the teaching of appellate case opinions to illuminate how law can be used to 
legitimize injustices). 
33 See Bennett, supra note 15, at 171 (describing law professors’ use of lecture as a 
backup teaching method in Socratic classrooms “when it is necessary to save time and 
cover material faster”). 
34 See Michael C. Dorf, The Five-Minute Law School: Everything You Learn in Your First Year, 
More or Less, FindLaw Legal Comment. (Aug. 3, 2005), http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/ 
20050803.html. 
35 See id. Father Guido Sarducci is a fictional character created by comedian Don 
Novello. See Moober1, 5 Minute University, YouTube (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v= qLAd4NzuqYM. In his stand-up routine, the comic cleric talks of founding 
a university in which he will offer classes to teach only the information that the average 
college graduate remembers five years after graduation. Id. His Economics class is simply 
“supply and demand.” Id. His Theology course is “God is everywhere.” Id. 
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ingly.”36 Tort, he explains, “means the breach of a legal duty imposed 
by law (rather than voluntarily undertaken by contract). That’s about a 
third of the course.”37 
 Professor Dorf’s column implicitly suggests that precious peda-
gogical resources have higher and better uses than conveying substan-
tive knowledge of existing legal principles. We can predict that knowl-
edge of today’s substantive law, which may soon be altered or obsolete, 
will not be particularly useful in facing an uncertain future.38 Although 
few legal educators argue that it is a high institutional priority to intro-
duce students to the substantive legal framework of a wide swath of 
law’s numerous topic areas, looking at the overall curriculum of most 
law schools might lead one to conclude that this approach has been 
made a priority.39 On the other hand, if legal reading, reasoning, re-
search, and writing skills—the 4 Rs—are among a law school’s educa-
tional priorities, as they should be, then legal education should equip 
students to discover and synthesize the relevant legal principles in any 
substantive area, no matter how it evolves.40 
C. Re-Imagining the Twin Mission 
 This observation leads inexorably to the conclusion that maximiz-
ing the future value of law students’ three-year sojourn41 will require 
law schools to teach less about what the law is and more about what the 
                                                                                                                      
36 Dorf, supra note 34. 
37 Id. 
38 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 618 (“Given the substantive proliferation, complex-
ity, and fast-paced growth of modern law, it has been impossible to teach students the cor-
pus juris, in any meaningful sense . . . . At best, the law schools could convey to students a 
very small and rapidly outdated portion of all the substantive law . . . .”). 
39 See id. (critiquing “the law schools’ traditional commitment of the overwhelming 
bulk of teaching resources to the multiplication of classroom courses in a wide variety of 
substantive subject matters,” which leads to questions about why law schools “teach case 
reading and doctrinal analysis to the same students twenty-nine times sub nom. torts, con-
tracts, criminal law, admiralty, antitrust, civil rights, corporations, commercial law, conflict 
of laws, trusts, securities regulation, and so forth[]”). 
40 See id. While published treatises, reference books, practice manuals, and other com-
pilations can help lawyers pick up the substantive legal framework of any area with relative 
ease, reasoned analysis is a foundational legal skill of lawyering. See Bennett, supra note 
15, at 22, 169 (describing reasoned analysis as “perhaps the basic skill” of lawyering, while 
simultaneously asserting that law school should teach much more). 
41 Of course, there is nothing inevitable about the three-year law school curriculum. A 
handful of law schools have established a curriculum track for earning a J.D. in the span of 
two years. See Leigh Jones, Law School in Two Years Flat: New Program May Have Led to Higher 
Enrollment, Nat’l L.J. & Legal Times, May 29, 2006, at 4, 4. 
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law does and what lawyers do with law.42 Students must encounter law 
not just as a set of doctrinal principles, but also as a set of systemic 
processes. A curriculum designed to achieve these larger pedagogical 
aspirations would be organized around foundational professional skills 
and the contexts for using them, aimed not at having knowledge but at 
using knowledge.43 Adopting a theme of skills development would give 
the law school curriculum a cohesive purpose consistent with Albert 
Einstein’s observation that “‘[e]ducation is what remains after one has 
forgotten everything he learned in school.’”44 
 The point is yet more obvious in other fields of study. Music stu-
dents with aspirations toward the other Carnegie would benefit from 
understanding the underlying principles of music theory. Studying 
music teaches music students to think like musicians. But they cannot 
achieve their aspirations as Carnegie-bound musicians unless they can 
enact this thinking in performance over and over again.45 That is 
what being a musician means. In the process of performance, a musi-
cian’s understanding of music’s underlying principles likely improves, 
deepens, and maybe even changes in some respects. 
                                                                                                                     
 Likewise, the Carnegie Report counsels legal educators that law stu-
dents become lawyers when they enact their understanding and analysis 
of legal principles in repeated lawyering performances.46 That is what 
being a lawyer means. In the process, a law student’s understanding of 
 
42 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 29 (observing that law schools undermine 
the “goal of training competent and committed practitioners” by neglecting the practical 
skills and professional identity apprenticeships “necessary to orient students to the full 
dimensions of the legal profession”). 
43 Id. at 26 (“The emphasis is not on acquiring information, as such; rather, it is on 
learning the concepts and procedures that enable the expert to use knowledge to solve 
problems.”). 
44 See Gordon W. Green, Jr., Making Your Education Work for You: A Proven 
System for Success in School and for Getting the Job of your Dreams 233 (2010) 
(quoting Albert Einstein). 
45 The title of this symposium, The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Practice, plays with 
the analogy between developing expertise in music and developing expertise in law. The 
title is a reference to a quip that appeared in print in the 1950s, attributed to violinist Jas-
cha Heifetz. See Bennett Cerf, The Life of the Party: A New Collection of Stories 
and Anecdotes 335 (1956) (“Rumor is that a pedestrian on Fifty-seventh Street, Manhat-
tan, stopped Jascha Heifetz and inquired, ‘Could you tell me how to get to Carnegie Hall?’ 
‘Yes,’ said Heifetz. ‘Practice!’”) 
46 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 8, 14. Or stated in the negative: “Learning 
the law thus loses a key dimension when it fails to provide grounding in an understanding 
of legal practice from the inside.” Id. at 8. 
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law and legal principles is likely to improve, deepen, and change,47 
along with the ability to provide lawyering assistance in its multiple fac-
ets.48 Both the Carnegie Hall-bound musician and the Carnegie Report-
bred lawyer undergo a theoretically grounded developmental process 
of enacting underlying principles in performance, and only then do 
the principles acquire meaning, value, and life.49 
 The analogy implicit in the double reference to Carnegie in the 
title of this Symposium, The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Practice, 
illuminates the problem of trying to justify educational disregard of 
professional performance. Performance is a fundamental part of the 
twin mission of a professional trade school located in a university, oblig-
ing legal educators to undertake the challenges of teaching in a serious 
way a usable craft.50 Doing that requires a much sharper curricular fo-
cus than has prevailed thus far on the skill and value dimensions of le-
gal education.51 
 Of course, none of this is new. Among others, Jerome Frank said as 
much in the 1930s.52 A fellow member of the Legal Realist school of 
thought, Karl Llewellyn, echoed Frank’s critique of the law school 
method of instruction.53 In 1992, the MacCrate Report called for law 
schools to place a greater emphasis on professional skills and values.54 
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. at 13 (“Legal doctrine does not apply itself . . . . However, this type of knowl-
edge often comes most fully alive for students when the power of legal analysis is manifest 
in the experience of legal practice.”). 
48 See id. at 14 (“[I]f legal education had as its focus forming legal professionals who 
are both competent and responsible to clients and the public, learning legal analysis and 
practical skills would be more fully significant to both the students and faculty.”). 
49 See id. The difference is that musicians-in-training practice to prepare to perform 
and lawyers-in-training practice to prepare to practice. Due to the peculiarities of the Eng-
lish language, the means and the end in the legal profession sound one and the same, 
such that lawyers never get beyond practicing. 
50 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 10 (indicating that teaching through law 
practice “requires deciding, for particular purposes, how and how much conceptual learn-
ing and substantive knowledge is important for illuminating and guiding practice”). 
51 Id. at 28 (asserting that the goal of professional education is “to teach the skills and 
inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles, and responsibilities that mark 
the professional”). 
52 See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 916 (1933) 
(emphasis omitted) (“Law students should be given the opportunity to see legal opera-
tions.”). 
53 Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 23 (“[Lawyer’s work] is impossible unless the lawyer 
who attempts it knows not only the rules of the law . . . but knows, in addition, the life of 
the community, the needs and practices of his client—knows, in a word, the working situa-
tion he is called upon to shape as well as the law with reference to which he is called upon 
to shape it.”). For a description of legal realist thinking, see generally Jerome Frank, Law 
and the Modern Mind (6th ed. 1949). 
54 See MacCrate Report, supra note 12, at 120. 
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In 2007, Best Practices for Legal Education picked up the call for contex-
tual legal education,55 and the Carnegie Report translated this observa-
tion into apprenticeship parlance, citing the need for law schools to re-
invigorate their apprenticeships of skills and professional identity.56 
There are nuanced differences between these proposals.57 For pur-
poses of this discussion, however, these nuances hardly matter, because 
together these voices sound an unrelenting theme: legal education 
must devote greater attention to what lawyers do in the world.58 
                                                                                                                     
 The difference that matters now is that a confluence of forces has 
lent a new urgency to the situation.59 The very survival and sustainabil-
ity of legal education may depend on how we respond this time.60 The 
likely reason that law school teaching methods have remained fairly 
stable over time and relatively impervious to calls for change is that, for 
many years and for many people, things were working well enough.61 
Although legal education has been costly and focused on a subset of 
important skills, jobs were plentiful, debt could be repaid over time, 
faculty could accomplish a considerable amount of research, and 
workplaces could invest resources in training law graduates, or at least 
absorbing and accommodating them while graduates cobbled together 
 
55 Roy Stuckey & Others, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a 
Road Map 1–5 (2007). 
56 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 32–33 (“[R]ecovering the formative dimen-
sion of professional education for the law lies in . . . . a searching examination of the im-
portance of experience with all three of the apprenticeships—cognitive, practical, and 
formative.”). 
57 Compare Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 32–33, with Stuckey et al., supra note 
55, at 1–5. 
58 Jerome Frank said this plainly. See Frank, supra note 52, at 913 (arguing that, without 
giving up the case-dialogue method of teaching or the law school’s “growing and valuable 
alliance with the . . . social sciences, the law schools should once more get in intimate con-
tact with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers actually do”). The Carnegie 
Report strikes a similar chord, noting that “[i]t is in these situations of intensive analysis of 
practice that the fundamental norms and expectations that make up professional expertise 
are taught.” Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 10; see also id. at 33 (“It is difficult to imag-
ine a stronger emphasis on formation that does not also require schools to place more 
relative weight on preparation for practice, including exploration of the ethical demands 
of the profession.”). 
59 See Kellogg, supra note 2, at 19; supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
60 See Olivas, supra note 4, at 3; Sloan, supra note 4, at 6–7; supra notes 2–7 and accom-
panying text. 
61 See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 30, at 598 (explaining that the appellate case method 
of legal education has had staying power because it simultaneously serves multiple goals and 
constituencies, including the “intellectually respectable” instruction of “large numbers of 
students at relatively little expense”). 
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the skills they needed.62 Prognosticators are increasingly asserting, 
however, that this approach to legal education is no longer viable.63 In 
times of economic restructuring and constraint, as now, the relation-
ship between the workplace and the law school changes,64 and the legal 
profession has deepened its reliance on legal education for preparing 
students to function effectively in a variety of professional settings.65 
II. Expanding the Clinical Project 
 How will law schools respond this time to the renewed challenge of 
the present market? Although the next chapter of the curriculum re-
form story is not yet written, there is reason to hope that law schools 
will indeed rise to the occasion and the opportunity.66 This hope is 
rooted in the presence of clinical education in virtually every law school 
curriculum, and the capacity for legal education to tap this critical re-
source more fully and effectively. 
 For a variety of historical reasons, law school clinics began to pro-
liferate more than four decades ago.67 Although clinics are not typically 
well-integrated into the general law school curriculum, most law 
schools consider them indispensable, even if they are not always ac-
corded all the trappings of academic respect.68 Throughout these four 
                                                                                                                      
 
62 See Matasar, supra note 5, at 21 (reporting that these realities have changed dramati-
cally); Nicholas S. Zeppos, 2007 Symposium on the Future of Legal Education, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 
325, 326 (2007) (“[T]he law schools’ monopoly over the training of lawyers will not count 
for very much unless their students continue to command the handsome salaries that en-
able them to pay off their loans . . . . This depends on the continued economic health of 
the legal profession [employing] large numbers of entry level practitioners . . . .”). 
63 See Kellogg, supra note 2, at 24 (“[T]uition has become a pressure point that threat-
ens the entire enterprise.”); Matasar, supra note 5, at 21 (“[L]aw student educational costs 
are rising, student debt is rising, the job market is tanking, and there is no end in sight.”); 
supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
64 Matasar, supra note 5, at 24–25 (examining changes in the economic relationship 
between law schools and legal employers); see also Segal, What They Don’t Teach, supra note 5 
(stating that, “for decades, clients have essentially underwritten the training of new law-
yers,” which, due to economic decline, they are no longer willing to do). 
65 Matasar, supra note 5, at 24 (describing the refusal of clients to pay for services of 
novice lawyers and the resulting pressure that legal employers are exerting on law schools 
to produce better trained graduates). 
66 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 132; Kellogg, supra note 2, at 23. 
67 See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for this Mil-
lennium: The Third Wave, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2000) (describing the historical 
events in the 1960s and ’70s that led to the widespread creation of clinical programs in law 
schools around the country). 
68 See Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 How. L.J. 31, 40 (1993) 
(describing the marginalization of clinics, their faculty, and their students); Zeppos, supra 
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decades, law school clinics have been shouldering the lion’s share of 
the pedagogical burden for developing in law students the sorely 
needed apprenticeships of skills and professional identity.69 One impli-
cation of the Carnegie Report is the suggestion that law schools need 
more clinical education and that they need to accord it a more central 
place in legal education generally.70 To grasp the Carnegie Report’s ar-
gument, one must have a grasp on the nature of the method of instruc-
tion employed by clinical educators. 
A. Clinical Methods 
 The language that I prefer for understanding the conceptual space 
that clinics occupy comes from Professor Tony Amsterdam: clinics pro-
vide an opportunity for law students, at an early phase of professional 
formation, to focus on “ways of thinking within and about the role of 
lawyers.”71 In other words, the subject of clinical education is the habits 
of thought and behavior that lawyers need to effectively perform their 
professional responsibilities.72 In the interests of curricular coherence, 
legal educators could do worse than to deploy this description as a basic 
operating principle for all of legal education. 
 While there is much more to learn about the pedagogical effec-
tiveness of various methods of legal education,73 there is reason to be-
lieve that students will better internalize good lawyers’ habits of 
thought and action when they assume the role of lawyers and receive 
knowledgeable guidance while they are considering how to approach 
problems that lawyers encounter.74 The goal is for these students to 
                                                                                                                      
 
note 62, at 326 (observing that “experiential modes of education have not been fully inte-
grated into the academic curriculum”). 
69 See Carnegie Report, supra note 8, at 30–31, 120 (describing the need to bolster 
the skills and professional identity apprenticeships of legal education). 
70 Id. at 33, 120–21 (“It is difficult to imagine a stronger emphasis on [the formative 
dimension of professional education] that does not also require schools to place more 
relative weight on preparation for practice . . . .”). 
71 Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 612. 
72 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 28 (“The essential goal . . . is to teach the skills 
and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles, and responsibilities that mark 
the professional.”); see also Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired 
Outcomes in Clinical Law Courses, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 807, 834 (2007) (“[T]hrough this ex-
perience of lived responsibility [for outcomes that affect clients,] the student comes to grasp 
that legal work is meaningful in the ethical, as well as cognitive, sense.”). 
73 See Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 Clinical L. Rev. 57, 59–
60 (2009) (“[D]iagnoses of [legal education’s] inadequacies far outpace our understand-
ing of potential solutions.”). 
74 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 616 (describing the clinical method of having stu-
dents approach legal problems in the role of attorneys and subjecting their performance to 
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learn careful and thorough deliberation in service of action on behalf 
of others who have entrusted them with responsibility for a particular 
aspect of their well being.75 
 When this enterprise is functioning at its best, the intellectual and 
the practical are not separable, not distinguishable, but tightly inter-
twined. The focus is not just on what the students are learning but on 
how their learning influences their professional judgment and mani-
fests in strategic professional choices. Habits of thought are useful, dis-
cernable, and testable only when they are enacted. The emphasis is not 
on what students are getting but on what they are becoming.76 
 Acting on behalf of others is a principal feature of lawyering and 
therefore it would seem to be a sensible feature of training to become a 
lawyer.77 Numerous skills and values enable effective action on behalf of 
another. For example, lawyers must communicate and collaborate effec-
tively with others and establish a sufficient interpersonal connection 
with clients to come to understand their objectives and their pros-
pects.78 Good lawyering also entails awareness of available processes and 
institutions from which the client might request a ruling or a remedy.79 
Strategic planning requires thorough consideration of the plausible al-
ternative routes to a client’s objectives, the capacity to weigh their rela-
tive risks and benefits, to make sound decisions among them, and to 
                                                                                                                      
rigorous analytical review with clinical faculty); Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some 
Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in Clinical Education for the 
Law Student: Legal Education in a Service Setting 374, 383 (Council on Legal Educ. 
for Prof’l Responsibility ed., 1973) (describing the pedagogical value of having law students 
assume the role of attorneys); Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Educa-
tion, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 185, 186 (1989) (asserting that role assumption is the fundamental 
methodology of clinical education but challenging its use in certain instances). 
75 See Maynard J. Toll, CLEPR from the Viewpoint of Legal Aid and Legal Services, in Clini-
cal Education for the Law Student: Legal Education in a Service Setting 17, 25 
(Council on Legal Educ. for Prof’l Responsibility ed., 1973). 
76 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 45 (“The challenge is to align the practices of 
teaching and learning within the professional school so that they introduce students to the 
full range of the domain of professional practice while also forming habits of mind and char-
acter that support the students’ lifelong growth into mature knowledge and skill.”). 
77 See id. at 82 (arguing that, because law practice requires “engagement with situa-
tions,” so too should legal education). 
78 See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Robert D. Dinerstein, Isabelle R. Gunning, Kathe-
rine R. Kruse, & Ann C. Shalleck, Lawyers and Clients: Critical Issues in Inter-
viewing and Counseling 23 (2009) (elaborating some of the issues that emerge from, 
and the skills important to, self-conscious understanding of lawyers’ interactions with cli-
ents). 
79 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 614. 
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enable the client to participate effectively in the decision-making proc-
ess.80 
 While strategic planning and problem-solving on behalf of others 
are intellectual and practical skills that lawyers need, along with inter-
personal skills that contribute to obtaining an understanding of the 
content for planning and judgment processes, even this somewhat 
cumbersome description is vastly oversimplified. Through interper-
sonal dynamics and planned activities, lawyers obtain an abundance of 
information. To seek it and to use it, lawyers must understand the po-
tential value and relevance to a legal matter of each piece of informa-
tion that they can imagine or acquire.81 
 This description also oversimplifies because a lawyer’s develop-
ment and processing of information consists of a number of related 
skills: how to analyze the information provided; how to frame potential 
legal theories within that information; how to deal with inconsistencies, 
omissions, and uncertainties in the details obtained; how to determine 
what other facts might be found or created that would be relevant and 
helpful; how to go about obtaining this information; and how to fold 
the information gathered into the refinement of a legal theory that will 
provide an organizing principle for the welter of detail.82 Moreover, to 
be used in a demand letter, a pleading, an adjudicative forum, or some 
other relief-seeking or help-seeking endeavor, this material must be or-
ganized into a narrative form, to persuade decision-makers that what is 
being sought is a fair resolution of the matter. Creating persuasive nar-
ratives involves yet another set of skills.83 
 Describing the analytic components of any complex activity, includ-
ing lawyer’s work, is no easy feat, nor is teaching lawyer’s work to law 
students through cultivation of the various skills embedded in it. It 
seems unlikely, however, that the interactive skills of lawyering, such as 
those involved in information development, strategic planning, and 
                                                                                                                      
80 Amsterdam describes these sorts of lawyering activities as engaging analytic skills 
such as “[e]nds-means thinking,” “[h]ypothesis formulation and testing in information 
acquisition,” and “[d]ecisionmaking in situations where options involve differing and of-
ten uncertain degrees of risks and promises of different sorts.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
81 Id. (“Hypotheses about what is really relevant are the precondition of effective in-
formation gathering.”). 
82 Id. at 615 (describing an important lawyer’s task as deciding “which state of facts 
should be created in view of the relative costs and benefits of each including the compara-
tive risks of the best, worst, and intermediate legal results that might obtain under each 
state of facts.”). 
83 For a text that illuminates the way that narratives operate throughout law and the 
legal system, see Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 110 
(2000). 
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professional decision-making, can be taught in classes where facts are 
already organized, distilled, and determinate.84 To the contrary, teach-
ing lawyering in a deliberate way would seem to require the case method 
of instruction to move from a two dimensional to a three dimensional 
enterprise, that it be less about case comprehension and more about 
case creation, that it be less reductive and more realistic, based not on 
how cases are characterized for appellate judges but on how they arise 
from people and practices in the world. A generation ago, clinical edu-
cators conceived a holistic method like this as a basis for lawyering edu-
cation.85 
B. Teaching Effective Lawyering 
 Although legal educators have learned a great deal about the skills 
of practicing law by qualitatively analyzing the work of law practice, re-
cently we have started to acquire systematic, empirical knowledge of the 
large palette of lawyers’ professional skills. After spending years en-
gaged in an elaborate and costly research project with a large sample of 
subjects, Professors Marjorie Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck of University 
of California, Berkeley have conceptualized and statistically validated 
twenty-six skills vital to the arts of lawyering.86 For a variety of complex 
political and institutional reasons, their research has not had the 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 30, at 601 (“Factual statements [in appellate opin-
ions] do little to equip students to navigate overlapping and diverging witness accounts, 
gaps in forensic material, disputes over significance levels in statistical studies, or the influ-
ence of a narrative frame. Appellate opinions hide, rather than display, how ‘facts’ are 
constructed and [support] more than one narrative . . . .”). 
85 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
86 See Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Final Report: Identification, De-
velopment, and Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering 26–27 (2008), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/LSACREPORTfinal-12.pdf. The re-
search identified twenty-six effectiveness factors that Shultz and Zedeck grouped in eight 
categories: 1) intellectual and cognitive abilities, including analytic reasoning, problem-
solving, and situational judgment; 2) research and information gathering abilities, including 
interviewing skills and fact-finding skills; 3) communication abilities, including listening and 
advocacy (oral and written) skills; 4) planning and organizational abilities, including organiz-
ing and managing one’s own and others’ work; 5) conflict resolution abilities, including em-
pathy and negotiation skills; 6) entrepreneurship abilities, including advising and counseling 
clients and networking for business development; 7) collaboration abilities, including rela-
tionship-building and mentoring skills; and 8) character, including diligence, passion, and 
integrity. Id. The goal of the research was to develop other tests besides the Law School Ad-
missions test (LSAT) to measure lawyering promise for purposes of informing law school 
admissions decisions. Id. at 15. While the research found these factors to comprise effective-
ness in lawyering, they are skills with obvious value beyond lawyering. See id. at 25–26. Indeed, 
the effectiveness factors read like a compilation of skills for effectiveness in life in general. 
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blockbuster impact that it should have, nor has it been followed by re-
search on the educational methods which will best cultivate the broader 
array of lawyering effectiveness skills that they identified.87 
 Regardless, the reality that there is more to know about lawyering 
and legal education does not free us from the imperatives inherent in 
what we do know about our teaching and our times. Case reading, 
analysis, interpretation, and application reveal legal principles, but we 
know that they are also foundational lawyering skills and that emphasiz-
ing the skills dimension of these practices in our pedagogy broadens 
their value.88 Accordingly, if legal educators seek to deepen our under-
standing of the effectiveness of pedagogical methods for inculcating a 
wide array of lawyering skills, nothing prevents us from adopting Shultz 
and Zedeck’s empirically derived skill sets, intentionally designing a cur-
riculum around developing them in our students, and then assessing 
whether we have accomplished the skills development that we sought.89 
 For now, clinical education offers the most promising means avail-
able for cultivating many of the legal skills that Shultz and Zedeck iden-
tified.90 Clinic students engage a wide-ranging and complex set of inter-
dependent skills that lawyers use and then analyze and reflect on that 
engagement.91 Should law schools enable clinics to teach these skills to 
all law students?92 Should clinics be available in the first year of law 
school?93 Are there other pedagogical approaches that can be devel-
                                                                                                                      
 
87 See Carol Ness, Smarts, for Sure—But What Other Qualities Make a Good Lawyer?, UC 
Berkeley News (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2009/ 
08/04_lawschool.shtml. The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC), the non-profit that 
administers the LSAT and markets LSAT preparation materials, provided initial financial 
support for the project but did not continue to fund the research in its later stages. Id. 
Christopher Edley, Dean of University of California Berkeley School of Law, offered this 
perspective: “‘Given the extraordinary quality of this research, the only excuse I can imag-
ine for LSAC refusing to invest more is that they don’t want to undermine the market 
power of the LSAT. That’s the problem with private-sector funding for truth-telling re-
search.’” Id. 
88 See supra notes 23–44 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra notes 71–89 and accompanying text. 
91 See Stuckey et al., supra note 55, at 166–67. 
92 See, e.g., Karen Tokarz, Peggy Maisel, Robert F. Seibel, & Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, 
Toward Universal Clinical Legal Education: Why the Time Is Ripe for Requiring Clinical Courses for 
All Law Graduates, N.Y.L. Sch., 2 (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/1/3/4/ 
15/1009/Mandatory%20Clinical%20Legal%20Education%20draft%20Sept%2021%20201
0-1.pdf. 
93 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. 
Schwinn, Teaching Legal Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education 
into the First Year, 12 Clinical L. Rev. 441, 442 (2006). Yale Law School already offers clinics 
to law students in the second semester of their first year. See Clinics & Experiential Learning, 
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oped, within or beyond the classroom, to help the clinics in their educa-
tional endeavors?94 These are the sorts of questions that we need to be 
addressing at this pivotal moment in the history of legal education. 
C. Teaching Learning While Teaching Lawyering 
 One of the twenty-six skills identified by Professors Shultz and 
Zedeck is self-development.95 It appears on their list of the character 
traits for effective lawyering.96 Translated into an educational goal, this 
research suggests that we explicitly endeavor to instill the skill of self-
development into a student’s character.97 Shultz and Zedeck’s report 
also discusses the skill of self-monitoring, which is, in part, the ability to 
learn appropriate actions for new situations.98 How would one develop 
that ability? A good start might entail analyzing past situations to de-
termine which actions worked well and which were less successful, then 
figuring out why. 
 The skill of self-development, as conceived by Professors Shultz 
and Zedeck, links with one of the major educational aims that has 
emerged from clinical instruction: facilitating students’ capacities to 
learn from their own experience.99 To the extent clinics are successful 
in doing so, graduates of clinics will have greater facility in extracting 
valuable learning from their post-graduation work. In Tony Amster-
dam’s words: 
[T]hirty or fifty years in practice will provide by far the major 
part of the student’s legal education, whether the law schools 
like it or not. They can be a purblind, blundering, inefficient, 
hit-or-miss learning experience in the school of hard knocks. 
Or they can be a reflective, organized, systematic learning ex-
perience—if the law schools undertake as a part of their cur-
                                                                                                                      
Yale L. Sch., http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/clinicalopportunities.htm (last visited Mar. 
17, 2012). 
94 See, e.g., Maranville et al., supra note 11, at 544–45, 547, 550, 553 (detailing the varie-
ties of forms through which experiential education opportunities involving real legal mat-
ters can be offered to students). 
95 See Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 86, at 27. 
96 Id. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 21. 
99 See Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learn-
ing to Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 Md. L. Rev. 
284, 284–85 (1981) (developing a clinical methodology that entails “a process of teaching 
and learning by focusing on experiences”). 
2012] Back to the Future of Clinical Legal Education 299 
ricula to teach students effective techniques of learning from 
experience.100 
 Clinical teachers attempt to achieve this goal by engaging students 
in analysis of their experiences.101 Clinic students are asked to make 
their thinking process visible, so that they can articulate, evaluate, and 
critique their choices in light of what has occurred.102 By asking stu-
dents to engage a set of questions designed to develop insights about 
what worked well, what did not work well, and why these results tran-
spired, clinical teachers seek to instill in students a conscious method 
for ongoing reflection on experience that they can carry with them 
into practice to support their continued self-improvement as practicing 
attorneys.103 
D. Emphasize What Can Generalize 
 Self-development and self-monitoring skills are especially useful to 
students who leave clinics for specialties outside of their clinic’s practice 
areas. While it is ethically necessary for clinic students to serve their 
clients well,104 it is at the same time educationally necessary for clinic 
students to learn generalizable lawyering habits, skills, and values.105 
                                                                                                                      
 
100 Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 616. 
101 Id. at 617. 
102 Id. at 616–17. 
103 Id. Professor Amsterdam suggests that clinic students learn to learn from ex-
perience by subjecting their lawyering performances to questions such as: 
What were my objectives in that performance? How did I define them? Might 
I have defined them differently? Why did I define them as I did? What were 
the means available to me to achieve my objectives? Did I consider the full 
range of them? If not, why not? What modes of thinking would have broad-
ened my options? How did I expect other people to behave? How did they 
behave? Might I have anticipated their behavior—their goals, their needs, 
their expectations, their reactions to me—more accurately than I did? What 
clues to these things did I overlook, and why did I overlook them? Through 
what kind of thinking, analysis, planning, perceptivity, might I see them better 
next time? 
Id. at 617. 
104 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic Students as Student-Lawyers, 45 S. 
Tex. L. Rev. 815 (2004). 
105 One of the generalizable skills and values that many clinics explicitly or implicitly 
seek to instill are those of systemic assessment or critique, skills which enable students to 
measure the legal system that they are actively observing against conceptions of justice and 
fairness. See Goldfarb, supra note 20, at 1659–60; see also Robert J. Condlin, “Tastes Great, 
Less Filling”: The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 35 J. Legal Educ. 45, 48–49 (1986) 
(arguing that clinics can help students to develop perspectives on the “nature of a fair and 
just legal system and the role of lawyer practices in operating and improving it”). This Ar-
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Among the most valuable of these generalizable skills is a usable under-
standing of how one thinks and behaves for purposes of learning im-
portant lessons from experience that can be applied to future choices 
and actions.106 This is a method with long-term benefits for clinic stu-
dents, no matter what professional opportunities they encounter in the 
future. Additionally, to return to my opening theme, when the world of 
law practice undergoes significant changes, these are the skills that may 
help graduates adapt to change.107 
 Some of the commentary on the changing landscape of legal prac-
tice has undervalued the role that clinical education can play in prepar-
ing students to face the legal profession of the future.108 This is due in 
part to the fact that, outside the community of clinical educators, the 
intention to teach generalizable skills, especially a rigorous method of 
learning from experience, is not widely understood as an aspect of 
clinical legal education.109 Clinic skeptics imply that practicing law in a 
legal services setting in a university is so much like practicing law as a 
new attorney in a typical law office that law schools should instead let 
students graduate early and receive income for their work, rather than 
taking their tuition dollars while they are enrolled in clinics.110 The im-
plication of this view is that while clinical education may help students 
learn how to engage in lawyering as it is practiced today, it will not help 
them in the markedly different world of law practice that has yet to 
emerge.111 Another questionable implication is that the university as-
pect of university-based legal services adds little of value to lawyers’ 
training. 
 The challenge that this perspective poses to clinical education 
counsels clinical professors’ intensified focus on our university-based 
                                                                                                                      
ticle addresses these skills under Part II.E, Pedagogy of Service, and endeavors to promote 
the notion that systemic observation and normative assessment operate at a skills level that 
clinics can cultivate. See infra notes 113–128 and accompanying text. 
106 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 616–17; supra notes 99–103 and accompanying 
text. 
107 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 616. 
108 See Morgan, supra note 2, at 207–08. 
109 But see Larry Kramer, Dean, Stanford Law School, Keynote Address at the Boston Col-
lege Journal of Law & Social Justice Symposium: The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, 
Practice—Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in Experiential Legal Education (Oct. 28, 2011), 
available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/newsevents/events/conferences/carnegie_ 
symp_twlj/carnegie_video.html (articulating the importance and value of clinical legal edu-
cation’s attention to the skill of learning to learn). 
110 See Morgan, supra note 2, at 203–05. 
111 Id. at 208 (critiquing the Carnegie Report’s recommendations for more clinical 
education because “increasing a student’s exposure to the old regime is likely to be a pro-
found waste of time and money”). 
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teaching mission as we provide profoundly needed legal services to in-
dividuals and communities. Skills such as communication, collabora-
tion, strategic planning, problem-solving, fact development, decision-
making, and systemic evaluation are likely to have some enduring 
value, even if they are used in somewhat different contexts in the legal 
profession of the future. Effective use of methods for learning from 
experience will enable law students who internalize them to grow and 
change as the legal profession transforms. Like other generalizable 
skills, reflective learning methods reach beyond the particular experi-
ence in which they are developed. Shultz and Zedeck’s research sup-
ports the idea that these are expansive habits of mind and action that 
can facilitate the ability of law graduates to discern what they can do to 
perform proficiently in the transforming legal profession that lies 
around the bend.112 
E. Pedagogy of Service 
 So far this Article has focused on the transferable skills pedagogy 
of clinical education, but the clinic’s pedagogy of personal and social 
responsibility is inextricably interconnected with it.113 Operating at a 
skills level, this pedagogy also implicates the values dimension of legal 
education that the MacCrate Report addressed114 and the apprenticeship 
of professional identity and purpose that the Carnegie Report identi-
fied.115 As they are learning, students in clinical programs are providing 
                                                                                                                      
112 Shultz & Zedeck, supra note 86, at 24–27; supra notes 95–99 and accompanying 
text. 
113 See, e.g., Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 
Clinical L. Rev. 505, 529–30 (1995) (describing the theoretical basis and practical im-
plementation of experiential courses designed to promote moral reasoning); see also David 
R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J. Le-
gal Educ. 67, 71–72 (1979) (“[E]ffective use of the clinical method is the only presently 
available means of consistently facilitating learning of ‘professional responsibility’ in a 
meaningful, internalized way sufficient to form an affirmative structure capable of guiding 
behavior . . . .”); Condlin, supra note 105, at 66–67 (“[I]f one is interested in a moral phi-
losophy of lawyering it is necessary to deal with these questions in the first person.”); David 
A. J. Richards, Moral Theory, the Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professional-
ism, 31 J. Legal Educ. 359, 374 (1981) (“Professional education, which educates the most 
powerful class of people in our society, receives these people at a crucial age in which, in 
response to the circumstances of professional education, they will or will not develop bet-
ter capacities for ethical reasoning concomitant with their professional identity.”). 
114 See MacCrate Report, supra note 12, at 138–41 (asserting that law school should 
instill values through asking students to personally provide competent representation; to 
strive to promote justice, fairness, morality, and the improvement of the profession; and to 
seek out professional self-development). 
115 See Carnegie Report, supra note 12, at 126, 128–29. 
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vital legal services to people in need of them. What is the role of law 
schools and lawyers in responding to the legal needs of the communi-
ties around them? The very existence of clinical programs poses this 
question and proposes this answer: responding to these needs is an ob-
ligation of all who participate in the legal profession.116 
 Skills acquire value in their use. It matters for what purpose skills 
are used.117 Law is understood as a profession because it is intended to 
serve a public good.118 Among the obligations that the legal profession 
places on lawyers is that they work to give meaning to concepts such as 
fairness, equality under law, and equal access to justice.119 The integrity 
of the legal system depends on lawyers to do this.120 So, the argument 
runs, professional skills are always serving professional values, we oper-
ate within a profession that has articulated particular values, and it is 
                                                                                                                      
116 The answer that clinical education proposes is consistent with a widely shared per-
spective on the obligations of professionalism. For example, Walter Bennett, a retired pro-
fessor and judge, argues that lawyers, having been “granted by society a virtual monopoly 
on providing legal services,” must undertake a “serious, profession-wide commitment to 
represent poor people” and others who cannot afford legal services. Bennett, supra note 
15, at 142–43. Bennett strongly critiques the legal profession’s failure to fulfill this obliga-
tion, asserting that “[t]he chief ethical failing of the American bar is the fact that only 
approximately 20 percent of the legal needs of the United States’ 35 million poor people 
are being met by the legal profession.” Id. at 142. To excuse this “failing of the legal profes-
sion,” Bennett suggests, is “an astounding repudiation of the most basic professional re-
sponsibility.” Id. at 143; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Law-
yers and Law Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2419 (1999) (describing the pro bono 
obligations of lawyers and law schools that follow from the legal profession’s monopoly on 
the provision of legal services); Rachel Moran, Op-Ed., Bring Back Citizen-Lawyers, Nat’l L. 
J. & Legal Times, Jan. 19, 2009, at 22, 22 (calling for the revival of an earlier era’s concep-
tion of citizen-lawyers who would use their skills to serve the common good). 
117 Bennett, supra note 15, at 125 (stating that professional responsibility entails law-
yers’ persistent inquiries about whom they are serving, and an intention to serve the 
greater good); see also Talcott Parsons, Professions, in 12 International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences 536, 536 (David L. Sills ed., 1st ed. 1968) (“[F]ormal technical train-
ing . . . . must lead to . . . mastery of a generalized cultural tradition . . . . [and] some insti-
tutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially responsible 
uses.”) (quoted in Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 73, at 57 n.19). 
118 See Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Am. B. Ass’n, Teaching 
and Learning Professionalism: Report of the Professionalism Committee 6 (1996) 
(indicating that lawyers serve clients and the public “as part of a common calling to promote 
justice and public good”). 
119 See Bennett, supra note 15, at 142 (asserting that the legal profession “must seriously 
undertake the pursuit of a broader ideal of justice,” including “giving voice to the voiceless 
in our current system” and providing fair access to the legal system for all, regardless of 
means). 
120 See id. 
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incumbent upon law schools to promote these professional values.121 
An extraordinary benefit of clinical education is that it surfaces these 
values, they can be readily identified and discussed, and they emerge 
experientially from work that advances these values.122 
 Public service skills and values have deep roots in the history of 
clinical education, from its early beginnings as a vehicle for law stu-
dents to volunteer their time in providing legal services to the poor to 
its current incarnation as an important part of the law school’s aca-
demic program.123 It remains noteworthy that law schools in the 1960s 
and ’70s began locating legal services offices in university settings and 
giving students academic credit for their participation, moving clinical 
education from an extracurricular to a curricular endeavor.124 In part, 
law schools were responding to student demands for relevance in edu-
cation in an era of antiwar protest and civil rights activity.125 They were 
also operating from a perspective that universities have obligations to 
the communities in which they sit.126 Presumably, locating a legal ser-
                                                                                                                      
 
121 See MacCrate Report, supra note 12, at 136 (among other values, law schools 
should instill in students the value of “striving to promote justice, fairness, and morality”). 
122 See Goldfarb, supra note 20, at 1659 (“Learning to articulate one’s tacit normative 
framework is a vital feature of clinical skills training, for it helps young lawyers to avoid falling 
hostage to the unarticulated norms of the prevailing practices.”); see also Condlin, supra note 
105, at 50–51 (“The ability to judge day-to-day law practice against objective standards of jus-
tice and fairness is an essential quality of a good citizen and a good lawyer.”). 
123 See Barry et al., supra note 67, at 5–13 (describing various stages of evolution of 
clinical programs); Maranville, supra note 11, at 521–26 (providing a thumbnail history of 
the development of clinical legal education). 
124 See Maranville et al., supra note 11, at 521–22; see also Rachel Moran, Transformation 
and Training in the Law: Serving Clinical Legal Education’s Two Masters, AALS News, May 2009, 
at 1, 2, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/april2009newsletter.pdf 
(“The [clinical] movement was forged at a time of legal activism, when the courts were seen 
as a forum ripe for pursuing social change[, and] . . . . bore a strong resemblance to the legal 
aid clinics that had taken root in low-income, disadvantaged communities around the na-
tion.”). 
125 See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s 
to the 1980s, at 216 (1983); see also Philip G. Schrag & Michael Meltsner, Reflec-
tions on Clinical Legal Education 3 (1998) (“Clinical legal education was born in the 
social ferment of the 1960s.”); Muneer Ahmad, Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 
Remarks at the Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Symposium: The Way to 
Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Practice—Pedagogy, Social Justice, and Cost in Experiential 
Clinical Legal Education (Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/ 
newsevents/events/conferences/carnegie_symp_twlj/carnegie_video.html (describing the 
importance of clinical education’s historical roots in the protest movements of the 1960s 
and ’70s). 
126 This perspective is apparent in the language regarding graduate and post-
secondary education in the 1998 amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965. See 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1139–1139h (2006) (repealed 2008); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (repealed 2008); Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. 
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vices office in a university makes it a different animal than a legal ser-
vices office located in another nonprofit setting or in the private work-
place. It is crucial to think carefully about what the juxtaposition of 
university and legal services settings offers and how to realize the full 
potential of what it offers. 
 Teaching lawyering in the context of assisting individuals and 
communities subordinated by social structures, such as class, race, gen-
der, culture, and education, opens dimensions for learning. These di-
mensions may include fostering greater awareness of lawyers’ participa-
tion in a public service profession, developing understanding of what 
subordination means in people’s lives and how it operates on a regular 
basis, and gaining perspective on the role that law can play both in ad-
dressing problems or exacerbating them.127 These are intellectually 
challenging matters that universities invest considerable resources in 
exploring with students in other contexts.128 It follows, then, that a legal 
                                                                                                                      
 
L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (repealed 2008). These amendments included an Urban 
Community Service section with a described purpose of “provid[ing] incentives to urban 
academic institutions to enable such institutions to work with private and civic organiza-
tions to devise and implement solutions to pressing and severe problems in their commu-
nities.” § 752(a), 112 Stat. at 1798–99. 
127 See David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. 87, 123–24 (1990) (arguing that because law practice implicates questions of social 
engineering and the pursuit of justice, clinics provide a curricular setting for examining 
models of justice-in-action, an inquiry germane to law school and university education). 
128 Subordination and social inequality are subjects that receive cross-disciplinary at-
tention in university settings. For instance, Cornell University funds an interdisciplinary 
Center for the Study of Inequality to foster “research on social and economic inequalities, 
as well as the processes by which such inequalities persist.” See, e.g., CSI: Center for the Study 
of Inequality, Cornell Univ. Center Study Inequality, http://inequality.cornell.edu 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Many schools offer courses addressing structural issues of sub-
ordination, such as Georgetown’s “Social Inequality” course. See Social Inequality, George-
town Univ. Sch. Continuing Studies, http://scs.georgetown.edu/courses/2314/social-
inequality (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). The effort to understand issues of subordination and 
inequality also arises in the service-learning context, where community-related work is 
used to teach practical skills, improve the welfare of others, and impart to students a sense 
of social responsibility. Ernest Boyer, a former U.S. Commissioner of Education and Presi-
dent of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, was an early propo-
nent of service learning. See Ernest L. Boyer, Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities 
of the Professoriate 77–78 (1990) (“If the nation’s colleges and universities cannot help 
students see beyond themselves and better understand the interdependent nature of our 
world, each new generation’s capacity to live responsibly will be dangerously diminished.”) 
(quoted in Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Program Should Embrace Civic Engagement, Service 
Learning, and Community Based Research, 10 Clinical L. Rev. 723 (2004)). Many universities 
now have formal service-learning programs and centers, which engage students, in part, in 
understanding and seeking to redress social inequalities. See GW’s Center for Civic Engage-
ment and Public Service, George Wash. U., http://www.gwu.edu/explore/campuslife/stu- 
dentinvolvement/serviceengagement (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); Leadership and Community 
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services practice in a university setting is a logical place to invest energy 
in exploring with students in a grounded way how law and social struc-
tures of subordination intersect, the way these issues manifest in peo-
ple’s lives, the legal problems they generate, and the impact that law and 
the legal profession can have in reinforcing or remediating these issues. 
F. Facing Economic Realities 
 The educational depth of clinical methods and the level of respon-
sibility for others’ lives that a student-lawyer shoulders, limit the num-
ber of students that any clinical faculty member can teach at any one 
time.129 Consequently, compared to the mass education of the large law 
school classroom, clinical education is a costly method of instruction.130 
In times of economic constraint, a call to expand clinical education 
may be difficult to heed.131 
 In conducting a broad economic analysis of law schools’ curricu-
lum and purpose, we should remember to take account of another 
emerging reality: in times of economic constraint, the scale of unmet 
legal need increases. Training a cadre of lawyers with the capacity to 
respond to the growing need for legal services among people who are 
increasingly unable to afford these services is an integral part of the 
mission of legal education.132 Clinically educated law graduates are a 
promising pool from which to draw the lawyers who will provide these 
services.133 
                                                                                                                      
 
Service-Learning, U. Md., http://www.csl.umd.edu (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); Service Learn-
ing Program, Marquette U., http://www.marquette.edu/servicelearning (last visited Mar. 
17, 2012). 
129 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 617 (“Because they are highly individualized, clini-
cal teaching methods require very low student-teacher ratios and are therefore relatively 
expensive.”). 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 617–18; Peter A. Joy, The Cost of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. 
Just. 309, 328 (2012). 
132 Legal education must take on this mission because the legal profession as a whole 
has taken on this mission, at least in its stated norms. See Rhode, supra note 116, at 2416–
17; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Preamble ¶ 6 (2010) (requiring lawyers as 
“public citizen[s]” to “devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to 
ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social 
barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel”). But see Spencer Rand, Teaching 
Law Students to Practice Social Justice: An Interdisciplinary Search for Help Through Social Work’s 
Empowerment Approach, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 459, 463–64 (2006) (decrying the profession’s 
lack of guidance about how lawyers should address social justice issues). 
133 After analyzing the findings reported in After the JD, Professors Rebecca Sandefur 
and Jeffrey Selbin concluded that the report’s positive correlation between clinical experi-
ence in law school and public service employment obtains only for those lawyers who came 
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 Stated differently, the cruel dilemma of the moment is that the 
same economic conditions that make clinical education increasingly 
difficult for law schools to afford make clinical education increasingly 
necessary for law schools to offer. Legal educators will need to be crea-
tive in meeting this challenge.134 The hard truth is that expanding 
clinical education may well require that something else contract, to en-
able law schools to bear the cost of increasing curricular reliance on 
the clinical methods that law schools need now more than ever.135 De-
spite the challenges of making trade-offs, the situation may also pose a 
genuine opportunity to rethink the law school curriculum in a manner 
that makes legal education more adept. Circumstances may be forging 
the motivational conditions for a curricular overhaul long overdue. 
G. Too Little and Too Much 
 A strength of clinical education lies in its multiple important goals 
and its contextual methods. There, too, lies a weakness of clinical edu-
cation. With so much to accomplish by such labor-intensive means, it is 
tempting and sometimes necessary for clinical teachers to abandon 
some portion of what ideally we strive to achieve. 
 As classroom teachers sometimes limit their sights to substantive 
law coverage rather than the far more transferable skills of reasoning 
about cases, clinical teachers can limit their sights to the already com-
plex and indispensable task of guiding student-attorneys to represent 
their immediate clients well. Faced with time constraints and over-
                                                                                                                      
to law school with a commitment to public service. Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 73, at 
102. In other words, clinical experience may work to sustain or intensify the public service 
commitments of those who enter law school with the intention of pursuing them, even if 
the evidence cannot show that clinics generate such commitments in students who enter 
law school for other reasons. See id.; see also Law Sch. Survey of Student Engagement, 
Student Engagement in Law School: In Class and Beyond 8 (2010), available at 
http://lssse.iub.edu/pdf/2010/2010_LSSSE_Annual_Survey_Results.pdf (reporting that 
law students with experience in clinic or pro bono work were more likely than other stu-
dents to indicate that law school adequately prepared them to understand future clients’ 
needs, to work cooperatively in a team, to understand professional values, and to serve the 
public good through the profession). 
134 See Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 
247, 274 (2012); Maranville et al., supra note 7, at 547, 550, 553 (describing the many 
structural permutations available for providing experiential legal education and for sup-
porting the creative design of programs that involve students in learning through work on 
real legal matters). 
135 See Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 618 (suggesting that law schools can fund greater 
use of clinical teaching methods by reducing the “vast mass of large-class doctrinal teach-
ing” and that this endeavor is “well worth the difficulties”); Barry, supra note 134, at 274; 
Joy, supra note 131, at 328. 
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commitment, clinical professors sometimes choose to forego explicit 
attention to other educational opportunities inherent in the same prac-
tice scenarios. In doing so, they may miss the chance to cultivate a 
broad array of generalizable skills; to support systemic evaluation of law, 
society, and legal institutions; to inculcate professional identity and the 
values of public service; and to instill methods of learning through 
critical review of experience.136 
 The uncertainties of the future give us yet more reason to try, 
wherever possible, not to cut these corners. These are the very corners 
that will empower our students to adapt to what lies ahead in the world 
they will enter. It is worth mention that sometimes accomplishing these 
aspirational goals does not require making more time, but rather mak-
ing alternate use of some of the time we already spend, particularly in 
the post-mortem phase of analysis of our three-dimensional cases. In 
other instances, clinical teachers may need to commandeer more re-
sources to accomplish broader goals, but even a small infusion of new 
resources may greatly multiply the lasting effect of what we do. 
 Obviously, the time and resource questions are intimately interre-
lated, and both are formidable problems. Because the expansion pro-
posed in this Article is not an additive model but a reconfiguration, le-
gal educators can choose to do less of some things as a means to doing 
more of others.137 A potential redeployment of resources toward clini-
cal education may increase the availability of clinically trained faculty 
and enable clinical educators to teach more effectively within the time 
constraints that they have perennially faced. 
 Yet regardless of the prospects for resource redeployment, given 
the broad ambition for clinical methods, time and resource shortfalls 
will remain a persistent challenge. In the process of striving to address 
that challenge and to accomplish the significant goals that we have 
framed, we will be recommitting to our professional identity and pur-
pose as legal educators. This recommitment will support our teaching 
as intentionally as we can in accord with our highest aspirations. 
                                                                                                                      
136 See supra notes 86–122 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra note 135 and accompanying text; see also Maranville et al., supra note 11, at 
538 (“Because no law school has unlimited resources, a decision to fund one project is 
often a decision to close the door on another.”). 
308 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:279 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 Woody Allen famously said, “‘I’m not afraid to die. I just don’t 
want to be there when it happens.’”138 Likewise, some legal educators 
may say, “I’m not afraid of change. I just don’t want to be there when it 
happens.” Regardless of the choices that legal educators make, change 
is happening around us and will continue to happen. The horse has 
taken off and our choices are to watch where it goes or to seize the 
reins. This Article recommends the latter, so that we can exert as posi-
tive an influence as we can on the future of clinical legal education that 
starts now. 
 
138 See Lama Surya Das, Awakening to the Sacred: Creating a Spiritual Life 
From Scratch 74 (1999) (quoting Woody Allen). 
